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Case Comments
Constitutional Law: Selective, Nonreligious Conscientious
Objector Is Exempt from Combatant Military Service
Defendant refused induction into the Army, claiming to be
conscientiously opposed, on ethical and moral grounds, to killing
in the Vietnam war. After being indicted by a grand jury, defendant moved to dismiss the indictment, contending that the
Government has no constitutional authority to conscript persons
to serve in an undeclared war. The district court denied the
motion, holding that the questions presented concerning the nature of military activities were outside the court's jurisdiction.'
Upon conviction of refusing induction, 2 defendant filed a motion
in arrest of judgment3 challenging the constitutionality of the
statute exempting conscientious objectors.4 The district court
per Wyzanski, C. J., granted the motion, holding that the first
and fifth amendments guarantee a selective, nonreligious conscientious objector the constitutional right to exemption from
combatant military service in an undeclared war not involving
a direct defense of the homeland. Alternatively, the court held
that section 6(j) of the Military Selective Service Act of 19675
unconstitutionally discriminates against nonreligious conscien-

tious objectors in violation of the first amendment.

United

States v. Sisson, 297 F. Supp. 902 (D. Mass. 1969).6
1. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 511 (D. Mass. 1968). In a
separate proceeding, the defendant also moved to dismiss the indictment
on the ground that he was being ordere, to fight in a genocidal war contrary to international law. The court held that this was a political
question requiring the elicitation of facts and disinterested judgment of
which a domestic court is incapable. United States v. Sisson, 294 F.
Supp. 515 (D. Mass. 1968).
In a third opinion, the court held that the defendant was not entitled
to introduce expert opinion to show that United States actions in Vietnam are a breach of international obligations undertaken by the United
States. United States v. Sisson, 294 F. Supp. 520 (D. Mass. 1968).
2. See Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 12(a), 50 U.S.C.
App. § 462 (Supp. IV, 1969).
3. FED. R. Camn. P. 34. This rule provides that a judgment shall
be arrested "if the indictment ...

does not charge an offense ....

"

If

a judgment is arrested because it is based on an invalid statute, 18 U.S.C.
§ 3731 allows direct appeal from a district court to the Supreme Court
of the United States.
4. Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456(j) (Supp. IV, 1969).
5. Id.
6. Jurisdictional decision postponed until hearing on the merits,
-

U.S.

-,

90 S. Ct. 92 (1969).
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Conscientious objector exemptions of varying scope have
been enacted whenever the United States has resorted to nationwide conscription. The initial statute," exempting members of
traditional peace sects such as Quakers and Mennonites from combat service in World War I, was upheld by the Supreme Court
in the Selective Draft Law Cases.8 The Court stated that the
establishment and free exercise clauses of the first amendment 9
neither require nor prohibit the conscientious objector exemption,10 which is merely a privilege."' This principle has been
2
followed by lower courts to the present.1
With the resumption of conscription in 1940, Congress broadened the exemption to include anyone "who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form."' 3 Thus, members of churches not
generally known for total opposition to war became eligible for
exemption, in addition to members of the "peace churches." The
critical question arising under the 1940 statute was whether
belief in a deity was necessary to invoke the exemption. Opposing answers emerged from the Second and Ninth Circuits. In
7. Act of May 18, 1917, ch. 15, § 4, 40 Stat. 78.
8. 245 U.S. 366 (1918).
9. "Congress shall make no law respecting an establishment of
religion or prohibiting the free exercise thereof .... " U.S. CONST.
amend. I.
10. 245 U.S. at 389-90.
11. See also United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931),
and Hamilton v. Board of Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245,
266-68 (1934) (Cardozo, J., concurring) (exemption on grounds of conscientious objection a privilege rather than a right). Macintosh held that
an alien conscientious objector may not be naturalized since the required oath exacts a promise to bear arms. Girouard v. United States,
328 U.S. 61 (1946), overruled Macintosh without affecting the point at
issue. Hamilton held that a student who voluntarily attends a state
university may be required to take courses in military science, despite
his religious beliefs.
12. See, e.g., George v. United States, 196 F.2d 445, 450 (9th Cir.
1952), cert. denied, 344 U.S. 843 (1952); United States ex rel. Brooks v.
Clifford, 296 F. Supp. 716, 724 (D.S.C. 1969). However, the cursory examination often given by courts to the constitutional claims together
with recent developments concerning the "religion" clauses of the first
amendment have led several commentators to doubt the present vitality
of this position. See Comment, The Conscientious Objector and the
First Amendment: There but for the Grace of God ..

..

,

34 U. Cur.

L. REV. 79 (1966); Brodie & Sutherland, Conscience, the Constitution,
and the Supreme Court: The Riddle of United States v. Seeger, 1966
Wis. L. REv. 306.
13. Selective Training and Service Act of 1940, ch. 720, § 5(g), 54
Stat. 889.
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United States v. Kauten14 the Second Circuit adopted a broad
view of religion which included both theistic and nontheistic beliefs, while the Ninth Circuit, in Berman v. United States, 5 required that an objector believe in a deity to qualify for exemption.
In 1948, Congress apparently adopted the Berman viewpoint
by requiring a belief in a "Supreme Being" and excluding "essentially political, sociological or philosophical views or a merely
personal moral code."' 6 In 1965, however, the Supreme Court
in United States v. Seeger.7 emphasized the use of the term
"Supreme Being" instead of "God" and concluded that Congress
intended to allow the broadest possible application of the exemption statute.18 Consequently, persons with essentially nontheistic beliefs such as humanism or ethical culture were judicially
included within the exemption.
In 1967, Congress deleted the "Supreme Being" criterion but
otherwise left the exemption intact. 19 This alteration appears
to have little, if any, effect on the scope of the exemption since
it does not include any new limitation on the phrase "religious
training and belief." The exemption now extends to theistic and
at least some nontheistic religious objectors "to participation in
war in any form" but still excludes those who object because of
political, sociological, philosophical or personal moral views.
The court in Sisson offered alternative holdings, one nar14. 133 F.2d 703 (2d Cir. 1943); accord, United States ex rel. Reel
v. Badt, 141 F.2d 845 (2d Cir. 1944); accord, United States ex Tel. Phillips
v. Downer, 135 F.2d 521 (2d Cir. 1943).
15. 156 F.2d 377 (9th Cir. 1946), cert. denied, 329 U.S. 795 (1946).
It is noteworthy that the Supreme Court refused to grant certiorari here
even though there was a clear conflict between the two circuits.
16. Military Training and Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613
(1948). For a more extensive discussion of the history of the exemption
prior to 1965 see generally U.S. SELECTIVE SERVICE SYSTEM, CONSCIENTious OBJEcTIoN 1-65 (Special Monograph No. 11, 1950); Conklin, The
Conscientious Objector Provisions: A 'View in the Light of Torcaso v.
Watkins, 51 GEO. L.J. 252 (1963).
17. 380 U.S. 163 (1965).
18. Id. at 165.
19. Military Selective Service Act of 1967 § 6(j), 50 U.S.C. App.
§ 456 (j) (Supp. IV, 1969). This section provides in part:
Nothing contained in this title shall be construed to require
any person to be subject to combatant training and service in
the armed forces of the United States who, by reason of religious training and belief, is conscientiously opposed to participation in war in any form. As used in this subsection, the
term "religious training and belief" does not include essentially
political, sociological or philosophical views, or a merely personal moral code.
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row2 0 and one broad, for arresting the judgment. 21 On the nar-

row ground, the court held that Congress cannot constitutionally
discriminate against nonreligious conscientious objectors, due to
the mandate of the first amendment that "Congress shall make
no law respecting an establishment of religion ....*"22 By granting an exemption only to conscientious objectors who can demonstrate that their opposition is based on some form of religious
belief, the Government violates its required neutrality with re2
spect to religious practices.
The court relied on the Supreme Court's decision in Torcaso
v. Watkins24 to sustain its holding, but it failed to discuss the
problems that exist in deriving the result in the instant case from
the Torcaso decision. Torcaso held that a public official who
held nontheistic though religious beliefs could not be constitutionally required to declare a belief in God prior to assuming
office. Thus Sisson extends beyond Torcaso by prohibiting dis-

crimination against nonreligious persons, as opposed to nontheistic religious persons. There is, however, language in Torcaso supporting the Sisson result:
We repeat and again reaffirm that neither a State nor the Federal Government can constitutionally force a person "to profess
a belief or disbelief in any religion." Neither can constitutionally pass laws or impose requirements which aid all religions
as against non-believers, and neither can aid those religions
based on a belief in the existence of God as against those re20. This holding is termed narrow since it is limited to a consideration of the constitutionality of a statute and does not deal with
expansive constitutional rights nor selective objection as does the broad
holding.
21. The district court observed that the Supreme Court could rely
solely on the narrow holding, but the lack of absolute clarity and the
interrelatedness of the issues required the lower court to examine both
grounds. 297 F. Supp. at 906. Though the narrow holding followed the
broad one in the court's opinion, it will be discussed here first because
the issues are less complex and are involved in a solution of the broader
question.
22. 297 F. Supp. at 911-12.
23. See Board of Educ. v. Allen, 392 U.S. 236 (1968); Abington v.
Schemp, 374 U.S. 203 (1963); Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1
(1947). The neutrality theory was explained in Schemp:
The test may be stated as follows: what are the purpose and
the primary effect of the enactment? If either is the advancement or inhibition of religion then the enactment exceeds the
scope of legislative power as circumscribed by the Constitution.
That is to say that to withstand the strictures of the Establishment Clause there must be a secular legislative purpose and a
primary effect that neither advances nor inhibits religion.
374 U.S. at 222.
24. 367 U.S. 488 (1961).
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ligions founded on different beliefs. 25

The dicta in Torcaso invalidating distinctions between religious and nonreligious persons can be supported not only by the
establishment clause but also by the due process clause of the
fifth amendment. The argument, which is only implied by Sisson, is that the equal protection aspect of the due process clause
20-prohibits arbitrary discrimination among classes of citizens
27
even as to an exemption which is a privilege and not a right.
Several factors indicate the existence of arbitrary discrimination
in the statutory exemption for conscientious objectors. The wide
diversity of religious belief has made an exact definition of religion nearly impossible, and there is no sufficient or conclusive
aspect of religion separating it from philosophy, morals, ethics
or matters of conscience. 28 Due to these conceptual problems,
any legislative or judicial attempt to define religion will almost
25. Id. at 495 (emphasis added). The applicability of at least a
part of the Torcaso principle to the statutory conscientious objector
exemption was demonstrated by the second circuit opinion in United
States v. Seeger, 326 F.2d 846 (2d Cir. 1964), aff'd on other grounds, 380
U.S. 163 (1965). The circuit court held that Torcaso required the conclusion that the "Supreme Being" lhritation of the 1948 objector exemption, Military Training and Service Act of 1948 § 6(j), 62 Stat. 613
was unconstitutional as a denial of due process of law under the fifth
amendment and as a violation of the first amendment. 326 F.2d at
851-54. Although the Supreme Court, on appeal, avoided this constitutional issue by using a rather strained statutory construction based on
a questionable analysis of congressional intent in using the term "Supreme Being," (see text accompanying note 18 supra) the fact that the
Court resorted to dubious grounds suggests that the Court would have
held the statute to be unconstitutional if forced to consider the question.
Thus, several commentators have concluded that, on the basis of Torcaso,
the Court would invalidate a statutory exemption which made a distinction between theistic and nontheistic religious bases for conscientious
objection. See Conklin, supra note 16, at 276; Macgill, Selective Conscientious Objection: Divine Will and Legislative Grace, 54 VA. L. REV.
1355, 1365-67 (1968); Comment, Defining Religion: of God, the Constitution and The D.A.R., 32 U. Cm. L. Rxv. 533, 539, 541-43 (1965).
26. Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 641-42 (1969); Schneider v.
Rusk, 377 U.S. 163, 168 (1964); Boaling v. Sharpe, 347 U.S. 497, 499
(1954).
27. Speiser v. Randall, 357 U.S. 513 (1958). See note 11 supra.
28. The element of faith has been suggested as a differentiating
factor which is only applicable to religion, but the existentialist philosophies of the nineteenth and twentieth centuries cast doubt upon
the applicability of "faith" solely to religion. Moreover, conscientious
objectors cannot rely on past empirical verification for their beliefs,
and it is doubtful that reason alone can compel their beliefs in view of
the many immeasurable factors and complex interrelationships involved. Thus faith or intuition as the only other type of cognition must
lie a foumdation for their beliefs regardless of any avowed basis,
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certainly exclude some beliefs which some people consider to be
"religious." But an exclusion of certain "religious" groups from
benefits bestowed by the Government on similar groups amounts
to preferential treatment for some religions in violation of the
free exercise and establishment clauses. 29 The Seeger Court attempted to avoid these constitutional problems by defining religion comprehensively, 0 but when limits are drawn at the
fringes, any exclusion of particular beliefs must ultimately rest
on arbitrary distinctions.
An additional indicator of arbitrariness is the intensity of
the claim to exemption. As the Sisson court observed, the claim
of the sincere nonreligious conscientious objector can certainly
be as intense as that of his religious counterpart. Even if a difference in the magnitude of variously motivated conscientious
scruples against personal combat activity did exist, no indicator
could provide objective measurement of such a difference. Absent any discernible distinction, then, it appears illusory and
arbitrary to distinguish between religious and nonreligious objection on grounds of intensity. The problems of definition
and intensity indicate that the exclusion of nonreligious objectors from the exemption does indeed constitute an arbitrary discrimination in violation of due process requirements.
An argument urged in favor of restricting the exemption
to religious objectors is that it is possible to determine the sincerity, meaningfulness and importance of religious beliefs to a
conscientious objector claimant, whereas such a determination is
not feasible for those claiming the more individualistic nonreligious beliefs. 3 1 However, Seeger precludes a requirement of
strict belief in a traditional Supreme Being, and courts cannot
question the merits of the religious belief itself. 32 Therefore,
courts and draft boards cannot rely solely upon traditional objective criteria but must examine many unorthodox beliefs under the present law. Further, since a nonreligious objector's
personalistic beliefs are necessarily interrelated with his total
belief system, determination of the validity of his claim to ex29. Cf. Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947).
30. "We believe that under this construction, the test of belief 'in a
relation to a Supreme Being' is whether a given belief that is sincere
and meaningful occupies a place in the life of its possessor parallel to
that filled by the orthodox belief in God of one who clearly qualifies
for the exemption." 380 U.S. at 165-66.
31. See Stone, The Conscientious Objector, 21 CoLum. UiqV. Q.
253, 263 (1919).
32. United States v. Ballard, 322 U.S. 78, 86 (1944).
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emption will subject him to an examination wherein he will be
required to explain in some detail his personal position on philosophical and moral matters. But a religious objector might conceal his personal beliefs behind dogma or positions of an established church which are independent of his other beliefs, thus
permitting greater success in attaining an exemption.
The Sisson court concluded that there is no basis for distinguishing between religious and nonreligious objectors except
"religious prejudice." 33 Though the court provided a sketchy
discussion of its position, its conclusion has a reasonable basis
in the Torcaso establishment clause principle and the requirements of fifth amendment due process.
If the Supreme Court should adopt such a view in deciding
the instant case on appeal, the question arises whether any exemption whatever will remain, since removal of the limitation
may cause the entire exemption to fall. The "religious training
and belief" clause is probably not severable from the exemption
as a whole, for such a construction would require a finding that
Congress intended an exemption unlimited by any reference to
religion.34 The history of the exemption offers little support
for such a proposition. If, as a result, the entire exemption
were to be struck, Congress would be faced with the choice of
enacting either a valid exemption which eliminates conscientious
objector status or no exemption at all. An alternative for the
Court lies in finding a constitutional right to exemption.
On the broader ground, Sisson held that the free exercise
clause of the first amendment and the due process clause of the
fifth amendment guarantee a selective, nonreligious objector
a constitutional right to exemption from. combatant military
service in an undeclared war not involving a direct defense of
the homeland. Initially, the court noted that, notwithstanding
several Supreme Court decisions, 35 "it has not been actually decided that a conscientious objector, not within any group exempted by Congress" can be compelled to perform combat duty. 30
33.

297 F. Supp. at 911.

34. Cf. H.R. 12743, 91st Cong., 1st Sess. (1969) introduced by Congressman Allard Lowenstein (D.-N.Y.) which removes the requirement
of opposition stemming from "religious training and belief" and allows
exemption for objection to a particular war.
35. Hamilton v. Regents of the Univ. of Cal., 293 U.S. 245 (1934);
United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605 (1931). See text accompanying
notes 8-12 supra.
36. 297 F. Supp. at 908.

CASE COMMENTS
The court educed the constitutional right to exemption by bal-

ancing the interests in the defense of the nation, within the
context of a limited war, against the interests in not requiring

individuals to act contrary to deep religious or conscientious
objections to killing in a particular war.37 The court concluded
that the interests in the individual's liberty of conscience surpassed those in the need for his participation as a combatant in
the military actions of Vietnam. 38 Fundamental to the court's

balancing process is the proposition that sincere albeit nonreligious matters of conscience are entitled to the same rights under the free exercise clause as are religious beliefs, at least for
purposes of conscientious objection.
The court derived this constitutional right to exemption for

nonreligious objectors from a due process clause "expansion"
of the free exercise clause of the first amendment.

The basis

of the position, although not cited by Sisson, is expressed in the
Supreme Court decision of Sherbert v. Verner.3 9 In Sherbert
the Court held that the free exercise clause prevented a state
from withholding unemployment compensation benefits from a
person who, due to religious beliefs, refused to work on Saturday. The Court set out the criteria to be used in determining
the relative weights of the interests involved in such cases: "It
is basic that no showing merely of a rational relationship to some
colorable state interest would suffice; in this highly sensitive
constitutional area, '[0] nly the gravest abuses, endangering paramount interests, give occasion for permissible limitation.' "40
As a general matter the interests of the nation in the common defense certainly must be given great weight. However,
the Sisson court correctly perceived that the question for selective objection purposes is not one of national defense in the
abstract, but rather, national defense in terms of the particular
circumstances of the admittedly limited war in Vietnam. 41 Sev-

37. See R. PoUND, SOCILL CONTROL THROUGH LAw 68-81 (1942)
concerning balancing of the same class of interests.
38. 297 F. Supp. 910.
39. 374 U.S. 398 (1963). The Sisson court did, however, cite the
related case of In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), on remand, 267 Minn.
136, 125 N.W.2d 588 (1963) which allowed a person to be excused from
jury duty due to religious beliefs against such activity.
40. 374 U.S. at 406, quoting Thomas v. Collins, 323 U.S. 516, 530
(1945). Cf. People v. Woody, 61 Cal. 2d 716, 394 P.2d 813, 40 Cal.
Rptr. 69 (1964) (state's interest in prohibiting use of a hallucinogenic
plant does not outweigh an Indian's interest in using the plant for religious purposes).
41. 297 F. Supp. at 908-09. The significant problem of judicial
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eral factors influenced the court as to the degree of the threat
to United States' security posed by Vietnam. The court interpreted the absence of a formal declaration of war to mean at
least: "that the present situation is one in which the State Denartment and the other branches of the executive treat our action in Vietnam as though it were different from an unlimited
war against an enemy. ' 42 The improbability of a battlefront in
the United States resulting from Vietnam and the lack of serious
sacrifices required from civilians also indicated that Vietnam
poses something less than an imminent threat to the survival
of the United States. It must be recognized that even in a
limited war, such interests far exceed the national interest in
requiring a flag salute, 43 in providing juries,44 or in regulating

unemployment benefits. 45 But on the other hand, the fundamental nature of an objection to killing human beings 46 leads
to the conclusion that compulsory combatant military service
by those with religious scruples against war constitutes a greater
interference with religious freedom than does compulsory flag
saluting, jury service or working on Saturday. Additionally, it
is generally believed that a requirement of an affirmative act
in violation of a person's religious beliefs constitutes a more severe infringement of religious liberty than a requirement of
abstinence from a religious act deemed by the state to be immoral or against the public welfare or safety. 47 Such considerations led Chief Justice Stone to conclude that "nothing short of
the self-preservation of the state should warrant" denial of protection to conscientious objectors to warfare.48 Another commentator recommended that a form of the "clear and present
danger" test or a "grave and immediate harm" test be used to
determine when the national interests are in sufficient jeopardy
competence to consider this arguably political question is discussed at
text accompanying notes 62 & 63 infra.
42. 294 F. Supp. at 515.
43. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624
(1943).
44. See In re Jenison, 375 U.S. 14 (1963), on remand, 267 Minn. 136,
125 N.W.2d 588 (1963).
45. See Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963).
46. See Brodie &Sutherland, supra note 12, at 322.
47. Prince v. Massachusetts, 321 U.S. 158 (1944) (employment

of child labor to distribute religious tracts); Reynolds v. United States,
98 U.S. 145 (1878) (practice of polygamy); See Powell, Conscience and
the Constitution, in DmocRAcY AN NArnONAL UNiTy 29 (R.Hutchinson
ed. 1941); Stone, supra note 31, at 268-69.
48. Stone, supra note 31, at 268-69.
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to warrant interference with the right of free exercise of re-

ligion.•19 These considerations strongly suggest the conclusion
that an objector to all wars is entitled to an exemption, but is
the same true for a selective objector?

While the selective objector's convictions are generally not
as vehement as those of a total pacifist since the latter will en-

tertain no exceptions, the difference in the intensity of their
beliefs in relation to a particular war may be minimal. The
Sisson court stated that selectivity does not change the intensity
of the claim for exemption; in fact, a selective objector might
display "a more discriminating study of the problem, a more
sensitive conscience, and a deeper spiritual understanding."50
Furthermore, the propriety of granting exemption to the selective objector is conceptually related to the granting of an
exemption to the nonreligious objector, which issue is now considered.
In Everson v. Board of Education the Court stated:
Consequently, [a State] cannot [consistent with the free exercise
clause] exclude individual Catholics, Lutherans, Mohammedans,
Baptists, Jews, Methodists, Non-believers, Presbyterians, or the
members of any other faith, because of their faith, or Zack of
it, from receiving the benefits of public welfare legislation. 51
52
Justice Frankfurter, concurring,
In McGowan v. Maryland,
stated that the establishment clause prohibited legislative consideration of "man's belief or disbelief in the verity of some
transcendental idea and man's expression in action of that belief
or disbelief."'5 3 For purposes of conscientious objection, "nonbelief" or "disbelief" is not nihilism, but a belief in fundamental
ethical or moral principles without any concept of deity or other
theistic elements. Thus, these authorities support a conclusion
that the types of "non-belief" that have an operating characteristic resembling "belief"-the sincere, deep and fundamental
ones 54 --are constitutionally protected.
Furthermore, the constitutional problems discussed earlier 5
concerning problems of definition of "religion" make the distinc49. White, Processing Conscientious Objector Claims: A Constitutional Inquiry, 56 CALIF. L. REv. 652, 661 (1968).
50. 297 F. Supp. at 908.
51. 330 U.S. 1, 16 (1947) (first emphasis added).
52. 366 U.S. 420 (1961).
53. Id. at 465-66.
54. See Mansfield, Conscientious Objection - 1964 Term, 1965 RELIGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 1, 27.

55. See text accompanying notes 26-30 supra.
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tion between a "religious" objector and a nonreligious moral
objector difficult to draw, if indeed it should be drawn at all.
The putative distinction is vital in considering the selective objector as well as the total objector.
The "just war" doctrine, advocated by Thomas Aquinas, requires one to make determinations of a religious nature in regard to temporal events which may also be political facts.50 If a
member of a religious sect which adopts the just war doctrine
determines that a particular war is unjust, his conclusions arise
from "religious training and belief." When someone who is not
a member of a religious sect adopts the just war doctrine, his
motivation would seem to be essentially similar to that of the
religious objector, even though the latter's decision does not arise
from "religious training and belief." Thus, the denial of an
exemption to these selective nonreligious objectors would arguably violate the due process clause of the fifth amendment since
it constitutes an arbitrary discrimination against such objectors,
and it also violates the selective objectors' free exercise of religion.57 In opposition to this position, it is contended that the
exclusion of selective objectors is neither arbitrary nor a violation of free exercise since society has a paramount interest in requiring all persons to obey the commands of government without
56. Macgill, supra note 25, at 1374-75 lists the following criteria
for determining whether a modern war is just:
1. All peaceful means of resolving the conflict must have been
exhausted before recourse is had to war.
2. The war must be formally declared by legitimate authority.
3. The war must be in defense of a "morally preferable cause

against threats of destruction or the rise of injustice."
4. There must be reasonable assurance of success.
5. There must be, in the war as a whole and with respect to
any act within the war, a balance in which the good outweighs the evil.
6. The means of warfare must be legitimate: there must be
no indiscriminate killing of noncombatants.
See also Potter, Conscientious Objection. to ParticularWars, 1968 REIaGION AND THE PUBLIC ORDER 44.
57. 297 F. Supp. at 905. See Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1,
16 (1947), quoted at note 51 supra. See Hochstadt, The Right to Exemption from Military Service of a Conscientious Objector to a Particular
War, 3 HAmv. Civ. RIGHTS-CIV. Lm. L. REv. 1, 13 (1967) where the
author states:
Another type of religious selective objector would be the individual who arrives at his opposition to a war by a "complex
process of reasoning combining fundamental theological beliefs,
theologically derived ethical norms, convictions concerning ultimate loyalties, and specific impirical output.". . . . Such a process would be quite similar to that used by Christians for more
than 1500 years to assess whether a ccnflict is a "just war."

1970]
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each reserving an individual veto. 58

However, the exemption

claimed is not from the obligation to observe governmental decisions and to respect public order, but rather from the obligation of combatant military service, since the objector agrees to
accept alternative noncombatant service of military or civilian
nature. Consequently, there are substantial arguments requiring exemption for selective objection both on the basis of a balancing of interests and in regard to arbitrary distinctions prohibited by the fifth and first amendments. It appears that the
most effective way to assure that government neither advances
nor inhibits religion is to grant an exemption to religious and
nonreligious objectors alike by making the test for exemption
to be solely one of sincere, fundamental and intense conscientious
belief regardless of its source.
It has been suggested that exemptions granted on the basis
of individual conscience will result in fraudulent claims. In
Sherbert v. Verner,5 9 the Court observed that even if fraudulent
claims were prevalent, which was not shown, such a fact would
not "be sufficient to warrant infringement of religious liberties."0 0 The same considerations discussed above61 apply here
also to minimize the effect of this objection.
Accepting the above arguments in support of a limited constitutional right to exemption for all conscientious objectors, an
establishment clause problem remains. If the term "religion"
includes all sincerely held conscientious belief systems, at least
in relation to objection to war, then this view appears to result
in a prima facie violation of the establishment of religion prohibition, since it results in governmental protection of religion,
however defined. But to give religion such an inclusive definition is to remove, in effect, any "religious" (in the narrower and
more customary use of the term) considerations. Hence, the
conflict within the first amendment vanishes since all claimants
depend on the free exercise clause as the basis of their right to
exemption and the establishment clause to ensure no arbitrary
or unreasonable exclusions; i.e., to ensure inclusion. Thus, the
58. See West Virginia State Bd. of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624,
643 (1943)

(Black, J. and Douglas, J., concurring); Hamilton v. Regents

of the University of California, 293 U.S. 245, 268 (1934) (Cardozo, J.,
concurring); United States v. Macintosh, 283 U.S. 605, 624 (1931); Rabin,
When is a Religious Belief Religious: United States v. Seeger and the
Scope of Free Exercise, 51 CORNMELL L.Q. 231, 232 (1965).
59. 374 U.S. 398 (1963).

60. Id. at 407.
61. See text accompanying notes 31 &32 supra.
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test is no longer one of "religion" but of conscience.
A most serious problem with the Sisson decision, affecting
the court's jurisdiction, concerns the competence of the judiciary
to determine the magnitude and seriousness of a foreign military
campaign which is required to complete the balancing of interests. Generally, such determinations would appear to fall under
the political question doctrine since they require what the Sisson
court itself called elicitation of facts of which a domestic court
is incapable. 62 Though many indications of the gravity of the
situation are political questions, the lack of a formal declaration
of war is one indicator clearly amenable to judicial notice.,3
Other factors such as civilian sacrifices may be capable of factual
proof, but doubts exist as to their conclusiveness. However, at
least in relation to Vietnam, the general tenor of official and
nonofficial discussion indicates that the magnitude of the military conflict is such that exemption of truly conscientious objectors would not be a severe threat to national security.
Although both holdings are compelling, the narrow one more
so, they are not absolutely conclusive. Difficulties are implicit
in the expanded concept of freedom of "religion" when applied
to matters other than conscientious objection; activities which
were not previously considered religious might violate the establishment clause. However, it may be possible to limit the expanded concept of religion to the unique case of conscientious
objection. While the court treated many problems superficially
and did not adequately discuss the effect of various cases and
constitutional provisions, the ultimate conclusions in Sisson designate the most compelling path for the law's development.

62. 294 F. Supp. at 517-18.
63. This puts the discussion in 294 F. Supp. 511 in doubt since
conclusions from a lack of a declaration of war were not deemed
capable of judicial examination in that opinion,

Constitutional Law: Regulation Prohibiting War
Protest in High School is Unconstitutional
Petitioners were suspended from public junior and senior
high schools for wearing black armbands to school in protest of
the Vietnam war. The suspension was based upon a regulation
prohibiting the wearing of armbands which had been adopted
by the school authorities in response to the students' plans to
protest. Petitioners sought both an injunction to restrain defendant school officials from disciplining them and nominal damages.' The federal district court dismissed the complaint on the
ground that the school officials' action, in view of their fear of
disturbance, was a reasonable exercise of discretion. 2 The Court
of Appeals for the Eighth Circuit, dividing evenly, affirmed
without opinion.3 The United States Supreme Court reversed,
holding that the wearing of armbands in school is protected
under the first amendment 4 in the absence of a showing that
the wearing of such armbands materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of appropriate school discipline.
Tinker v. Des Moines Independent Community School District,
393 U.S. 503 (1969).
The first amendment guarantee of freedom of speech is applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment and
has been extended to local school boards as agencies of state
government.6 While the United States Supreme Court has in1. The action was brought as a civil action for deprivation of

rights under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 (1964).

2. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971 (S.D. Iowa

1966).
3.
1967).

Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 383 F.2d 988 (8th Cir.

4. U.S. CONST. amend. I provides: "Congress shall make no
law ... abridging the freedom of speech ... "
5. Hughes v. California, 339 U.S. 460 (1950); Whitney v. California, 274 U.S. 357 (1927); Gitlow v. New York, 268 U.S. 652 (1920).

The Supreme Court has not indicated that the standard for freedom of
speech applicable to the states through the fourteenth amendment is any
different from that applicable to the federal government under the first.
See Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943). In striking
down a federal statute as violative of freedom of speech, the Court in
Lamont v. Postmaster General, 381 U.S. 301 (1965), based its decision
wholly on cases involving state attempts to restrict freedom of speech.
6. Slochower v. Board of Educ., 350 U.S. 551 (1956); Brown v.
Board of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319
U.S. 624 (1943).
Through "state action" theories, the fourteenth
amendment may even reach private schools. See Guillory v. Administrators of Tulane Univ., 203 F. Supp. 855 (E.D. La. 1962). But see Greene
v. Howard Univ., 271 F. Supp. 609 (D.D.C. 1967).
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validated school provisions which have interfered with students'
rights to freedom of religion, 7 it has not previously had occasion
to pass on a case involving freedom of speech by secondary
school students.8 Courts which have considered the issue have
not been persuaded by allegations that a rule or disciplinary action by high school authorities unreasonably infringes upon a
student's right to freedom of speech, 9 and therefore such courts
have been reluctant to overturn discretionary actions by school
authorities. 10 To this end, courts presented with freedom of
speech claims by high school students have usually either rejected the assertion that the expression comes within first
amendment protection"' or have concluded that the state's inof its schools outterest in maintaining the orderly operation
2
weighs the student's interest in free speech.
In balancing these interests, courts have generally required
only that the regulations promulgated by the school board be
"reasonable"'13 and some courts have not even required this. 4
7. Engle v. Vitale, 370 U.S. 421 (1962); Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624 (1943).

Compare McCollum v. Board of Educ., 333

U.S. 203 (1948) (prohibiting use of public schools for religious instruc-

tion), with Everson v. Board of Educ., 330 U.S. 1 (1947) (upholding use
of public school buses to transport parochial school students).
8. Some language in Board of Elduc. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624

(1943) indicates that it was decided on freedom of speech as well as
freedom of religion grounds. However, it involved a statute compelling the recitation of a pledge and therefore does not constitute authority
for the situation where expression by a student is restricted. See also
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390 (1923); Bartels v. Iowa, 262 U.S. 404
(1923). The Court has applied freedom of speech protection to high
school teachers. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968),

following New York Times v. Sullivan, .76 U.S. 254 (1964).
9. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Ferrell v.
Dallas School Dist., 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966); Atkins v. Board
of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557 (1968). The courts
have been more prone to consider constitutional issues raised by college
students. Compare Dickey v. Alabama State Bd., 273 F. Supp. 612
(N.D. Ala. 1967), and Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D.
Ill. 1968).
10. Board of Directors v. Green, 259 Iowa 1260, 147 N.W.2d 854
(1967); Leonard v. School Comm. of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.
2d 468 (1965); State ex rel. Dresser v. School Dist. No. 1, 135 Wisc. 619,
116 N.W.322 (1908).
11. Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Leonard v.
School Committee of Attleboro, 349 Mass. 704, 212 N.E.2d 468 (1965).
But see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
12. Atkins v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1968); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill. 1968). But
see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
13. See, e.g., Kissick v. Garland Iad. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708
(Tex. Civ. App. 1959); Wright v. Board of Educ., 295 Mo. 466, 246 S.W.
43 (1922).
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Moreover, the "reasonableness" standard has often been illusory,
since courts have almost uniformly granted a strong presumption of validity to any school board rule 15 and have at times
characterized as "reasonable" even patently abusive actions by
school boards. 16 While some actions of school authorities have
been found unreasonable, 7 the question of reasonableness has
clearly not always been given thorough consideration. s In Fer9
rell v. Dallas Independent School District,"
for example, the
federal district court recognized long hair as a form of "free expression," the suppression of which would extend beyond the
classroom into the home. This convinced the court that it
should evaluate the impact of the prohibition of long hair in
view of the educational needs of the individual rather than by
emphasizing the need of the school to maintain discipline. While
the court noted testimony which indicated that long hair no
longer evoked disruption in school, it still dismissed the student's
claim because, in the court's view, the school board had acted
'20
"reasonably under the circumstances.
Two recent Fifth Circuit decisions, however, have departed
from this prevailing response to the claims of high school stu14. See, e.g., Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538
(1923) ('We are not required to find a valid reason for its promulgation
.. "); Bishop v. Huston Ind. School Dist., 29 S.W.2d 312 (Tex.
Civ. App. 1930) ('We are not concerned with the reasonableness of the
rule adopted by the Board .... ").
15. See Starkey v. Board, 14 Utah 2d 227, 381 P.2d 718 (1963);
State v. Stevenson, 27 Ohio Op. 2d 223, 189 N.E.2d 181 (1962).
In
Bishop v. Huston Ind. School Dist., 29 S.W.2d 312 (Tex. Civ. App. 1930),
the court said it would assume that any unnecessarily harsh, oppressive
or unreasonable rules would be declared invalid and inoperative by the
school board itself.
16. Pugsley v. Sellmeyer, 158 Ark. 247, 250 S.W. 538, 539 (1923):
"Courts have other and more important functions to perform than that
of hearing the complaints of disaffected pupils of the public schools
against rules and regulations . . . ." See also Wooster v. Sutherland,
27 Cal. App. 2d 51, 148 P. 599 (1915), where the court held "reasonable"
the suspension of a student for criticizing the school board for allegedly
maintaining an unsafe school building.
17. Board of Educ. v. Bently, 383 S.W.2d 676 (Ky. 1964); Trustees
of Schools v. People, 87 fll. 303 (1877). The rules overturned as unreasonable often concern the exclusion of married students from school.
See collection of cases discussed in Annot., 11 A.L.R.3d 996.
18. See Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967); Kissick
v. Garland Ind. School Dist., 330 S.W.2d 708 (Tex. Civ. App. 1959).
19. 261 F. Supp. 545 (N.D. Tex. 1966).
20. Id. at 552. Similar reasoning was employed by the courts in
Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. MI1.1968) and Atkins
v. Board of Educ., 68 Cal. Rptr. 557, 262 Cal. App. 2d 161 (1968).
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dents. In both cases, students in all-black high schools were
suspended for violating rules which prohibited the wearing of
"freedom buttons."2 1 The facts of the two cases were essentially identical except that in Bi*ackwell v. Issaquena County
Board of Education22 the students wearing the buttons attempted to force them upon other students, thereby causing a
general breakdown in classroom discipline, while in Burnside v.
Byars,23 the buttons evoked only "mild curiosity."24 On the
basis of this distinction, the Fifth Circuit held suspensions based
on the regulations valid in the former case but invalid in the
latter. The court adopted the test of whether the conduct materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of
appropriate discipline in the operation of the school.2 5 If such
interference is found to have been. present, the state interest in
maintaining school discipline, according to the Fifth Circuit, is
sufficiently compelling to justify overriding the students' rights
to express themselves. The two cases, taken together, illustrate
an attempt to accommodate the need for an orderly educational
environment without completely obliterating students' rights to
freedom of speech.
The United States Supreme Court in Tinker found that the
silent and passive wearing of black armbands in protest of the
Vietnam war was so "closely akin to pure speech ' 26 as to be entitled to comprehensive first amendment protection. The Court
therefore held that secondary school students are entitled to
free expression of their views in this manner in the absence of
a specific showing of constitutionally valid reasons against such
expression.
In promulgating the prohibition against armbands, Des
Moines school authorities were primarily concerned with the
27
controversy which had come to surround the Vietnam war.
21. It had been suggested that the civil rights issues in these cases
may detract from their authority as student discipline precedents. Note,
Public Secondary Education, 42 S. CAmr. L. Rev. 126 (1969). Subsequent action by the Supreme Court in 1he instant case, however, has invalidated this theory. Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 393 U.S. 503
(1969).
22. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966).
23. 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
24. Id. at 748.
25. 363 F.2d 749 (5th Cir. 1966). The same standard was applied
to college discipline in Dickey v. Alabama State Bd., 273 F. Supp. 613
(M.D. Ala. 1967).
26. 393 U.S. at 505.

27. The Supreme Court cited the memorandum of the school offi-

cials which contained no references to disturbance and the district
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Upon learning of the students' plan to wear black armbands,
school officials met and adopted the policy that any student
wearing an armband would be suspended unless the armband
was removed. Testimony of the school officials indicated that
the regulation was directed against the principle of demonstrations in schools. Focusing on the fact that this one act of protest
had been singled out for prohibition, the Tinker Court held that
the desire to avoid the unpleasantness resulting from the exposition of a controversial opinion is not a sufficient reason to
infringe upon the first amendment rights of students.
Thus, while recognizing that the state has a valid interest
in maintaining the orderly operation of its schools, the Court
refused to diminish the scope of students' rights to free expression where the rule is directed primarily toward the controversial nature of the subject and the general principle of demonstrations in schools rather than toward the disruption of school
life. The standard adopted by the Court is that the rule, to be
constitutionally valid, must be directed at conduct which "materially and substantially interferes with the requirements of
28
appropriate school discipline in the operation of the schools."

The Supreme Court in Tinker failed to find the requisite disruptive conduct.2 9
By adopting the "material and substantial interference"
standard, the Tinker Court sought to raise freedom of expression
in high schools to a constitutionally protected plane. The
Court commendably did not adopt the "reasonableness" test in
balancing the state's interest against the individual student's
rights, since "reasonableness" has more often been used as a
conclusion than as a test. 0 But rather than marking a substantial departure from the past practice of courts, the Tinker standard, by its terms, serves only to limit the facts which are to be
properly considered in determining whether the action of the
school authorities is constitutionally acceptable.
While the Court appeared to be primarily concerned with
court's recognition of the controversial nature of the subject. The decision of the district court, however, was based on the anticipation of
classroom disturbance. 258 F. Supp. at 973.
28. 393 U.S. at 509, quoting Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th
Cir. 1966).
29. But see 393 U.S. at 517, 518 (Black, J., dissenting).
30. See, e.g., Tinker v. Des Moines School Dist., 258 F. Supp. 971
(S.D. Iowa 1966); Scoville v. Board of Educ., 286 F. Supp. 988 (N.D. Ill.
1968); Atkins v. Board of Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rptr. 557
(1968). But see Burnside v. Byars, 363 F.2d 744 (5th Cir. 1966).
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protection of political expression, no attempt was made to limit
this new application of the first amendment. It is axiomatic
that freedom of speech does not guarantee the absolute right
to say anything at any time, even in public places.3 1 Particularly in schools, unfettered freedom of speech would often be
entirely inappropriate.
Moreover, while the Tinker Court attempted to establish a
standard for the degree of disruplion student conduct must entail before it may legitimately be subject to restrictions by school
authorities, the dearth of judicial opinion concerning political
protest in high schools leaves unanswered what conduct will
actually be subjected to the standard. In Tinker, passive conduct by protesting students resulted in no disruption, while in
Blackwell, the protesting students themselves precipitated a
general breakdown in classroom discipline. The difficult area
lies between these two situations, such as where passive conduct
of a student who is advocating En unpopular cause results in
substantially disruptive reactions from other students.3 2 It is
not clear whether the Court would find the passive, albeit unpopular, protest undeserving of protection 3 or whether any expression would be immune so long as the disruption does not
come from the protesting students.
While neither of these extremes would be desirable, the
84
Court makes no suggestion as to where it would draw the line.
Where the protesting student is engaged in silent, passive expression of his opinion, it would seem that the focus of discipline
should be directed at the disrupting student rather than the
protesting student. Obviously a different result would be appropriate where the protesting student intends to incite the
other students to a disruptive reaction. But where a silent,
31. See, e.g., Adderly v. Florida, 385 U.S. 39 (1966); Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
32. The question of long hair on male students would be close to
this problem. The Tinker Court specifically noted that the case did not
involve long hair. 393 U.S. at 508. The threshhold question is whether
long hair is a form of expression at all. Compare Atkins v. Board of
Educ., 262 Cal. App. 2d 161, 68 Cal. Rp-tr. 557 (1968), with Davis v. Firment, 269 F. Supp. 524 (E.D. La. 1967).
33. See, e.g., 1 B. ScHWARTZ, RIGHTS OF THE PERsoN 248 (1968);
Note, 49 COLumV. L. REV. 1118 (1948); cf. Terminiello v. Chicago, 337
U.S. 1 (1948); Edwards v. South Carolina, 372 U.S. 229 (1963). Compare
Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
34. Compare "disruptive conduct by those participating in it," 393
U.S. at 505, with conduct which disrupts "for any reason," 393 U.S. at
513.
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passive protest is involved, it is difficult to envision a situation
where it could truly be said that incitement is present.
How the Supreme Court would handle a case where the
student verbally protests is also unclear since the Court placed
great emphasis on the silent and passive nature of the symbolic
protest. While pure speech is generally accorded greater protection than "speech plus conduct," it is clear that the wearing
of an armband in a classroom entails less potential for disruption
than does a verbal expression. If the Court's assertion that the
meaning of armbands was "closely akin to 'pure speech' " and
thus was "entitled to comprehensive protection under the First
Amendment" 35 means that the Court places symbolic protest on
a constitutional plane with pure speech, the balancing of interests could very well result in greater protection afforded a symbolic protest than one entailing verbal expression.3"
The rule which prohibited the wearing of armbands in
Tinker was entirely prospective since the protest had not yet
taken place. In upholding the rule, the district court had accepted as reasonable the school board's fear of disruption.37 The
Supreme Court, however, rejected this finding, concluding that
the school authorities had no facts which "might reasonably lead
[them] to forecast substantial disruption." 38 The Court thus
not only refused to accept the district court's finding of fact but
also its legal premise. Citing Terminiello v. Chicago, 9 the Supreme Court refused to accept the fear or apprehension of disturbance as valid grounds for overcoming the right to freedom
40
of expression.
While it is doubtful that the Court intended the circumstances found in Terminiello to serve as a literal example of the
classroom, it did not indicate what degree of expectation must
35. 393 U.S. at 505, 506.
36. While this may seem constitutionally anomalous, there is no
reason (even in the literal language of the first amendment) that only
pure speech should be considered sacred, particularly when the symbolic expression being considered does not entail "conduct" in the active, physical sense of the word such as picketing or sit-in. Cf. Giboney
v. Empire Storage & Ice Co., 336 U.S. 490 (1949).
37. 258 F. Supp. at 973.
38. 393 U.S. at 514.
39. 337 U.S. 1 (1948). In Terminiello, the Supreme Court reversed a disorderly conduct conviction on first amendment grounds

where the defendant's speech precipitated a near riot. It seems significant that the disturbance occurred in a privately rented hall. Com-

pare Feiner v. New York, 340 U.S. 315 (1951).
40. 393 U.S. at 508.

MINNESOTA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 54:721

be present before a prospective rule would be acceptable. 41 The
Court's language suggests that "reasonable anticipation" of material disruption would be necessary, 42 but its flat disapproval
of "fear of disruption" leaves the exact requirement unclear.
The Court compounded the ambiguity by not indicating what
it would consider as evidencing a reasonable anticipation of disruption. It only noted that its "independent examination of the
record" did not disclose "reason to anticipate" substantial dis43
ruption of the school's operation.
A rule which anticipates the proscribed conduct would seem
to be highly desirable. But unless the Court demands a high
standard for the anticipation of the disturbance, much of the
protection afforded student expression by Tinker will be rendered ineffective. Rather than reverting to a notion of "reasonable" anticipation, a standard which requires a showing of an
immediate threat of disruption would better serve the purposes
of the material and substantial interference test, at least where
the expression involves political matters. 44 By requiring a
greater showing of immediacy, school authorities would be deterred from establishing broad prohibitions on classroom expression and would be forced to focus more closely on the ac45
tual potential for disruption.
The Tinker decision is no surprise in view of the Supreme
Court's recent interpretations of the first amendment. Most
41. The Supreme Court no longer: analyzes freedom of speech cases
strictly in terms of "clear and present danger." See, e.g., The Supreme
Court, 1966 Term, 81 HAxv. L. REV. 110, 153 (1965); Alfange, Free Speech
and Symbolic Conduct, 1968 Sup. C. REv. 1, 9, 19-21. Compare Dennis
v. United States, 341 U.S. 494 (1951), with Keyishian v. Board of
Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967) and Cox v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 536 (1965).
42. The Court's conclusion that the school authorities had no facts
which might reasonably have led them to forecast substantial disruption seems to imply that a reasonable amticipation of such conduct would
have constituted valid grounds for the rule.
43. 393 U.S. at 509.
44. The Court has considered expression of political opinions worthy of very broad protection. Rosen~blatt v. Baer, 383 U.S. 75 (1966);
Garrison v. Louisiana, 379 U.S. 64 (1965); New York Times v. Sullivan,
376 U.S. 254 (1964). It has been suggested that the "materially and substantially interferes" test is contrary to the broad immunity granted
criticism of government in New York Times. Recent decisions, 3 GoNZAGA L. REv.227, 235 (1968). However, it is important to note that New
York Times was concerned with the content of the speech while the
"materially and substantially interferes" test is intended to categorize
prohibitions only on the basis of time and place of the expression.
45. With the proposed standard of "immediacy," no less than
with the "reasonable anticipation" test, the Court should indicate what
facts could be considered as evidence.
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notably, criticism of the Government and government officials
has been given comprehensive protection, 46 and in the academic
area first amendment protection has been extended to both college 47 and high school teachers.48 Moreover, the rights of juveniles, while not yet recognized as coextensive with adults', can no
longer be denied in the absence of a countervailing advantage to
49
juveniles as a group.
The increasing political and social awareness of high school
students will probably lead to future collisions between school
discipline and the students' expression of their ideas. Possibly
even more so than in other areas, respect for the high school
students' right of expression should not suffer diminution except
in the most exigent circumstances."0

46. See, e.g., New York Times v. Sullivan, 376 U.S. 254 (1964).
47. Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589 (1967).
48. Pickering v. Board of Educ., 391 U.S. 563 (1968).
49. Cf. In re Gault, 387 U.S. 1 (1967); Kent v. United States, 383
U.S. 541 (1966); In re Urbasek, 38 Ill. 2d 535, 232 N.E.2d 716 (1967).
50. See, e.g., Board of Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 637 (1943):
That [the school boards] are educating the young for citizenship
is reason for scrupulous protection of Constitutional freedoms
of the individual, if we are not to strangle the free mind at
its source and teach youth to discount important principals of
our government as mere platitudes.

